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Abstract
We study a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth that produces
stochastic leadership cycles. Over a cycle, industry leaders can innovate
several successive times in the same industry, gradually increasing the
magnitude of their technological lead before being replaced by a new entrant. Initially, new leaders are eager to enlarge their lead and do much
of the research, but if they innovate repeatedly, their propensity to invest
in R&D decreases. Eventually they stop doing research altogether, and as
they are overtaken a new cycle starts. The model generates a skewed firm
size distribution and a deviation from Gibrat’s law that accord with the
empirical evidence. We also consider various policy measures, showing
that in some cases policy should favour R&D by incumbents, not outsiders, and that stronger patent protection may reduce innovation and
growth.
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Introduction

We propose a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth that endogenously
produces stochastic leadership cycles. In each industry, both the industry leader
and outsiders simultaneously invest in R&D. Initially, new leaders are eager to
enlarge their lead and do much of the research. However, if they are lucky and
innovate repeatedly, after each successive innovation their profits increase and
their share in the R&D done decreases. The process continues until incumbents
stop doing research altogether and are inevitably overtaken. A new cycle then
starts with a new leader.
This model can help reconcile endogenous growth theory with several stylized
facts not accounted for in early contributions. First, it is consistent with ample
empirical evidence that while outsiders are responsible for many innovations,
incumbents account for a sizeable share of the research done and often innovate
repeatedly in the same industry.1 Second, it endogenously produces a skewed
firm size distribution that resembles the upper tail of the distributions typically
found in empirical work.2 Finally, it implies that as leaders grow bigger and
older, they tend to rest on their laurels and do less R&D. This generates a negative correlation between the incumbents’ size and age and their expected rate
of growth, a deviation from Gibrat’s law confirmed by the empirical evidence.3
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first endogenous growth model
that provides a unified explanation for these stylized facts. Previous models in
which neither leaders nor outsiders are precluded from innovating in the same
industry either generate an “entrenchment-of-monopoly” effect whereby the risk
1 Segerstrom and Zolniereck (1999) and Segerstrom (2007) provide a nice summary of the
relevant empirical evidence.
2 A wide literature documents the skewness of the firm size distribution. For an excellent
contribution that provides also a survey of the previous literature, see Cabral and Mata
(2003).
3 See, among others, Evans (1987), Hall (1987), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2005), and
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006).
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that the incumbent is replaced decreases with the duration of its leadership, as
in Stein (1997), or predict that the probability that the incumbent is replaced
is constant, as in Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) and Segerstrom (2007).
Other models have followed different routes. Klette and Kortum (2004)
assume that incumbents can grow only by diversification, i.e., innovating in other
industries. In their model, which has subsequently been developed by Lentz
and Mortensen (2005, 2008) and others, incumbents that innovate repeatedly
are active in several industries, but in each of them they lead by only one step.
An alternative approach, followed by Aghion et al. (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2008), among others, posits that in each industry there are two
incumbents, which alone can invest in R&D. These models allow the size of the
leader’s advantage to vary, as we do, but they do not capture the process of firm
entry and exit, which plays a crucial role in many innovative industries.
Our model sticks more closely to the original papers by Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Segerstrom et al. (1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991a). The
only change is that incumbents are assumed to be more efficient than outsiders
in conducting research. This assumption seems natural when innovation is cumulative, since innovative technological knowledge that may be useful to search
for the next innovation is often disclosed only partially to outsiders. The assumption has in fact been made by several papers in the growth literature, but
previous contributions have added ancillary assumptions that prevent leadership
cycles.4
Making no special assumptions, we simply focus on the case where innovations are incremental (or non drastic), so that new innovators are constrained by
4 Grossman and Helpman (1991b), for instance, assume that the leader’s advantage is small
enough that all the research is conducted by outsiders. In their model, the leader invests in
R&D only if the innovation has been perfectly imitated: in this case, which we rule out in
this paper, Arrow’s effect vanishes, and the leader ends up conducting all the research. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1994) assume that the leader has not only an R&D advantage, but also
a first-mover advantage. This leads to a preemption equilibrium in which the leader again
conducts all research.
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outside competition in the product market and cannot engage in monopoly pricing.5 Then, for a range of parameter values the leader’s advantage in conducting
research can be exactly offset by Arrow’s replacement effect.6 As a result, neither leaders nor outsiders are precluded from innovating, and leadership cycles
can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In our model’s equilibrium, the probability that an incumbent is replaced
is one when a certain critical lead size is reached, which corresponds to the
maximum “length” of leadership cycles. The economy’s rate of growth depends
only on the profits obtained by incumbents that have reached the maximal lead
size. Intuitively, with constant returns to scale in research all “intermediate”
profits (i.e., the profits obtained by incumbents that enjoy a smaller competitive
advantage) are dissipated in the patent races which they participate in. The
size of these intermediate profits determines only the division of the total R&D
done among the incumbent and outsiders.
The model is tractable enough to yield a simple closed-form solution, so
it could lend itself (in future research) to various extensions. Here we use it
to address several policy issues. We are especially interested in ascertaining
whether policy should favour R&D investment by leaders or by outsiders, a
question that has broad policy implications (for example, in competition policy).
5 Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) show that with constant returns to R&D and drastic
innovations, in equilibrium either the leader or outsiders may conduct the research, but not
both. To obtain an equilibrium where both the leader and the outsiders simultaneously invest
in R&D, they then posit decreasing returns to R&D at the firm level (see also Segerstrom,
2007). Here, by contrast, we focus on non drastic innovations, retaining the assumption of
constant returns to scale in research. This assumption is standard in the endogenous growth
literature and seems to be well grounded both empirically and theoretically. For example,
surveying the empirical literature Griliches (1990, p. 1677) notes that

in the major range of the data [...] there is little evidence for diminishing returns,
at least in terms of patents per R&D dollar. That is not surprising, after all. If
there were such diminishing returns, firms could split themselves into divisions
or separate enterprises and escape them.
At the industry level, by contrast, the existence of decreasing returns to scale in research
is well documented. For simplicity, we make the assumption of constant return also at the
industry level, but this serves only to obtain a closed-form solution.
6 That is, leaders have a lower incentive to innovate than outsiders because the incentive
for them is only the incremental profit, i. e., the difference over the current profit.
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We analyze R&D taxes and subsidies and various patent policies. We show
that the economy’s rate of growth increases when the outsiders’ R&D expenditure is taxed and the revenue is used to subsidize the leaders’ R&D. As for
patent policy, we argue that when patent protection is state-dependent, our
model produces a trickle-down effect, as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008): the
incumbents’ investment in R&D increases if the level of patent protection in the
early stages of a leadership cycle is reduced. However, in our model this policy
does not affect the equilibrium rate of growth, as the incumbents’ greater R&D
investment crowds out the outsiders’ on a one-to-one basis.
We consider also the possibility that follow-on innovations may infringe on
the patents that protect previous innovators, as in O’Donoghue and Zweimuller
(2004) and Chu (2009). In this case, successful outsiders must pay a licensing
fee to the old incumbent, but no payment is due if the incumbent innovates
repeatedly. In a leapfrogging equilibrium where incumbents do not invest in
R&D, this form of patent protection is always bad for growth. We show that,
on the contrary, its effect can be positive when leaders can innovate repeatedly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 derives the conditions that must hold in a steady state equilibrium.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium where the total R&D investment is constant over a leadership cycle. Section 5 analyzes several innovation policies.
Section 6 discusses other equilibria, where the total R&D varies over a cycle,
and explains why the equilibrium where total R&D is constant is a natural
focal point. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. Proofs are collected in the
Appendix.

5
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2

The model

For ease of comparison, we build on the textbook quality-ladder model of Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004).

2.1

Preferences

The economy is populated by L identical, infinitely-lived individuals. Time is
continuous. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour and has
linear intertemporal preferences:
u(c(t)) =



∞

c(t)e−rt dt,

(1)

0

where c(t) is consumption at time t. With linear intertemporal preferences, the
equilibrium rate of interest is fixed and coincides with the rate of time preference r.7 Each individual maximizes (1) subject to the instantaneous budget
constraint:
c(t) + ȧ(t) ≤ w(t) + ra(t),

(2)

where w(t) is the wage rate and a(t) is the individual’s wealth. Individuals
are risk neutral, so in equilibrium by arbitrage all assets must yield the same
instantaneous expected net rate of return r.

2.2

Final and intermediate goods

There is a unique final good in the economy that can be consumed, used to
produce intermediate goods, or used in research. This good is taken as the
numeraire. It is produced in a perfectly competitive market using labour (which
is in fixed supply) and a continuum of intermediate goods ω ∈ [0, 1], the quality
of which increases with technical progress. We normalize the quality of all
intermediate goods at time 0 to unity and denote by λ > 1 the size of each
7 One

can easily allow for more general preferences (see footnote 15 below).
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innovation. Thus, the quality of intermediate good ω of vintage j(ω, t) is λj(ω,t) ,
where j(ω, t) denotes the number of innovations that have been achieved in
industry ω by time t.
The final good can be produced according to the following constant-returns
production function:

α
1
j(ω,t)

y(t) = L1−α 
λj(ω,t)−k q(j − k, ω, t) dω,
0

0 < α < 1,

k=0

where L is labour input, (1−α) is the share of labour’s income, and q(j −k, ω, t)
denotes the input of the intermediate good of type ω and vintage j − k, so that
j(ω,t) j(ω,t)−k
q(j − k, ω, t) is a quality-adjusted index of composite good ω
k=0 λ

that combines all past generations of intermediate goods of type ω.

Independently of its type ω and vintage j, each unit of intermediate good
can be produced using one unit of final good. Producers of intermediate good ω
compete in price, so in equilibrium only the latest vintage of intermediate good
ω is produced and employed in the production of the final good. Normalizing
L to one, the production function of the final good can then be re-written as:
1 
y(t) =
λj(ω,t) q(j, ω, t)

α

dω.

(3)

0

The amount of the final good used in the production of intermediate goods is
Q(t) =



1

q(j, ω, t)dω.

0

2.3

The R&D sector

In each industry ω, there is a sequence of patent races. As soon as innovation j is
achieved, a free-entry, simultaneous-move race to achieve innovation j +1 starts.
Both innovator j and a mass of outsiders can race to achieve innovation j + 1;
that is, outsiders need not duplicate innovation j before starting to search for
innovation j + 1. Thus, our model differs from step-by-step models à la Aghion
7
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et al. (2001). However, we assume that the current leader is more efficient than
outsiders in conducting research.8
The firms’ R&D investment determines the arrival of the innovation according to a Poisson stochastic process. The instantaneous probability that a firm
s = o, ℓi (where o stands for outsiders and ℓi for a leader that leads by i steps)
achieves innovation j + 1 in sector ω by time t is
xs (j, ω, t) =

Rs (j, ω, t)
,
cs gj

(4)

where Rs (j, ω, t) is firm s’s R&D investment in units of the final good and
α

g ≡ λ 1−α > 1. The term g j in the denominator of (4) means that research becomes increasingly difficult as new innovations arrive, an assumption that serves
to guarantee the existence of a steady state.9 The parameters cℓi and co measure the unit cost of research done by leaders and outsiders, respectively. All
outsiders, including past innovators, have the same R&D cost, but the leader
is more productive: cℓi < co . For simplicity, we assume that a leader’s productivity in R&D is independent of the size of its lead i: cℓi = cℓ . Relaxing
this assumption complicates the calculations, but does not affect our qualitative
results as long as cℓi does not decrease with i too fast.
Notice that the R&D technology (4) exhibits constant returns to scale both
at the firm level and at the industry level. While the assumption that there are
8 With symmetric unit R&D costs, models of step-by-step innovations differ radically from
models of leapfrogging. The former implicitly assume that there are no technological spillovers,
so laggards must independently duplicate all past innovations before moving up the quality
ladder. The latter are best suited to describe situations in which all innovative technological
knowledge is publicly disclosed, but patent protection allows only the patent holder to practice
the innovation. The truth probably lies somewhere in between, as technological spillovers are
ubiquitous but typically far from perfect. In step-by-step models, such partial spillovers can
be captured assuming that duplication is easier than innovation. In models of leapfrogging
such as ours, one can instead assume that leaders have an R&D cost advantage over outsiders.
Both modeling strategies essentially capture the same economic effect, and the choice of one
or the other is largely a matter of analytical convenience.
9 In a steady state, the expected waiting time to discovery must be constant. Since g is the
growth factor between successive innovations, as will be seen below, R&D investment grows at
rate g from one race to the next. Then in order for the aggregate hazard rate to be constant
the productivity of R&D must decline at rate g. This requires the knife-edge assumption that
the productivity of R&D expenditure decreases at rate g, which is standard in quality-ladder
endogenous growth models (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
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constant returns to R&D at the firm level seems well grounded both empirically
and theoretically,10 the assumption of constant return at the industry level is
made only to obtain a closed-form solution. Later, we shall argue that the
equilibrium we analyze is robust to the introduction of decreasing returns at
the industry level.
R&D projects are independent, so the aggregate hazard rate Xi (j, ω, t)
equals the sum of the individual rates:
Xi (j, ω, t) = xℓi (j, ω, t) + XOi (j, ω, t),
where XOi denotes the outsiders’ aggregate hazard rate. The total amount of
final good used in research is
R(t) =



1

[cℓ xℓi (j, ω, t) + co XOi (j, ω, t)] g j(ω,t) dω.

0

2.4

Patent policy

Initially, we assume that each innovation is patentable and there is perfect,
infinitely-long patent protection, meaning that nobody can imitate an innovation without infringing the patent that covers it. We also assume that no innovation infringes on previous patents, so innovators need not obtain any licence
from previous patent holders to practice their innovations. These assumptions
will be further discussed and relaxed in section 5.

2.5

Equilibrium concept

In our model, the labour market and the final good market are perfectly competitive, while firms may hold market power in the intermediate good markets
and behave strategically in patent races. We assume that perfectly competitive
markets clear at any point in time. When firms behave strategically, we focus
1 0 See

Griliches (1990).
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on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) where strategies depend only on payoffrelevant state variables.

2.6

Steady state

As new innovations arrive, the productivity of any one intermediate good jumps
up discretely by a factor g > 1 at random intervals, but since there is a continuum of intermediate goods, by the law of large numbers, the economy can grow
smoothly. A steady state is defined as a situation in which:
(i) the output of the final good, consumption, aggregate R&D expenditure,
the aggregate output of intermediate goods, and the wage rate all grow at a
constant rate, denoted by γ;
(ii) the fraction of industries in which the leader leads by i = 1, 2, ... steps,
denoted by κi , is constant;
(iii) the average hazard rate and expected waiting time for innovations are
constant.
We are interested in steady state MPE.

3

Equilibrium growth

In this section we derive the conditions that must hold in a steady state MPE,
analyze its stability, and calculate the equilibrium rate of growth as a function
of R&D investments.

3.1

Labour and goods market equilibrium

At any point in time, the wage rate adjusts so as to clear the labour market:
w(t) = (1 − α)y(t).
The market clearing condition in the final good market is
y(t) = c(t) + Q(t) + R(t),
10
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and by Walras’ law it is equivalent to the labour market equilibrium condition,
as we shall confirm below.
Now consider the intermediate goods markets. Profit maximization by perfectly competitive firms in the final good sector implies the following demand
for the last vintage of the intermediate good of type ω:
1

q(j, ω, t) =

α 1−α
1

p(j, ω, t) 1−α

g j(ω,t) ,

where p(j, ω, t) is its price. Notice that the demand for intermediate good ω does
not depend on the prices of the other intermediate goods (this follows from the
linear specification (3)). The demand function has a constant elasticity

1
1−α ,

α

and each innovation shifts demand up by the constant factor g = λ 1−α .
Since different vintages of a given intermediate good ω are perfect substitutes
at constant rates, firms producing different vintages can be treated as if all
were producing the same good, measured in efficiency units, but with different
costs that reflect the quantity of final good needed to make one efficiency unit.
Specifically, the effective marginal production cost of vintage k − i, in efficiency
units relative to the last vintage, is λi , since one unit of the intermediate good
of vintage k is as productive as λi units of the good of vintage k − i. With
Bertrand competition, in each intermediate good sector only the current leader
will be active in equilibrium. However, the equilibrium price depends on what
technology is available to its most efficient rival (i.e., the penultimate innovator),
which can supply the next most productive vintage.
1
1
The monopoly price is pM = . If λi > , the cost of the leader’s most
α
α
efficient competitor is greater than the monopoly price. The leader then is
effectively unconstrained by outside competition and can charge the monopoly
1
price. If instead λi < , the leader’s cumulated cost advantage is too small to
α
allow it to charge the monopoly price. In the ensuing Bertrand equilibrium, the
leader engages in limit pricing: pL = λi .
11
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Define m as the minimum lead size that allows the leader to charge the
1
monopoly price; that is, the minimum value of i such that λi ≥ . Accounting
α
for the integer constraint, m is implicitly given by the inequalities
λm ≥

1
> λm−1 .
α

Then, if i ≥ m, the leader charges the monopoly price and obtains the monopoly
profit
1+α

πm (j, ω, t) = (1 − α)α 1−α gj(ω,t) ,
which is independent of the size of its lead. If i < m, the leader engages in limit
pricing, and its profit is:
1

i

π i (j, ω, t) = (λi − 1)α 1−α λ− 1−α g j(ω,t) .
In this case the leader’s profit depends on i, the size of its technological advantage. To simplify the notation, denote
1

πi ≡

i

(λi − 1)α 1−α λ− 1−α
for i = 1, 2, ..., m − 1
1+α
1−α
(1 − α)α
for i = m, m + 1, ...

so that π i (j, ω, t) = π i g j(ω,t) .
The equilibrium price is independent of j, ω and t, but depends on i, the
number of consecutive innovations achieved by the current leader. This is determined endogenously, which marks a key difference from standard quality-ladder
models where the current leader never invests in R&D and so i is always equal
to one.

3.2

The patent race equilibrium

With a memory-less discovery process like Poisson, the payoff to any firm that
participates in a patent race does not depend on how much time has passed since
the start of the race, so in a MPE firms will choose a constant level of R&D
expenditure until someone succeeds and the next race starts. As we proceed, it
12

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper425

12

Denicolo and Zanchettin: Leadership Cycles

will become clear that in a MPE firms’ strategies must be independent also of
ω and j.
Let V1 (j, ω, t) be the expected value of leading by one step in industry ω at
time t if j innovations have already been made in that industry. This is given
by the following Bellman equation (to simplify the notation, we suppress the
indices ω and t when there is no risk of confusion):
rV1 (j) = max π 1 (j) − X1 V1 (j) + xℓ1 V2 (j + 1) − cℓ g j xℓ1 ,
xℓ1

(5)

where V2 (j + 1) is the expected value of leading by two steps if j + 1 innovations
have been previously achieved. The interpretation of equation (5) is simple.
The right-hand side is the expected flow value of leading by one step. A onestep leader earns the flow profit π 1 (j) and incurs the flow cost cℓ gj xℓ1 until
innovation j + 1 arrives. When innovation j + 1 is achieved, which occurs
with an instantaneous aggregate probability X1 , the leader incurs a capital loss
V1 (j), but in case it itself succeeds, an event whose probability is xℓ1 , it obtains
V2 (j + 1). That is, V2 (j + 1) − V1 (j) is the net capital gain obtained by a
one-step leader that innovates again. The leader chooses xℓ1 to maximize its
present expected profits. Equation (5) states that such maximized profits must
guarantee an expected rate of return on the leader’s asset, V1 (j), equal to the
equilibrium interest rate r.
The expected value of leading by two steps, V2 (j + 1), is in turn determined
by the following Bellman equation
rV2 (j + 1) = max π2 (j + 1) − X2 V2 (j + 1) + xℓ2 V3 (j + 2) − cℓ g j+1 xℓ2 ,
xℓ2

where V3 (j + 2) is the value of leading by three steps, and so on. After m
successive innovations, the leader becomes an unconstrained monopolist in the
product market. This implies that
Vm+1 (j + m) = Vm (j + m),
13
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since a firm leading by m or more steps will earn monopoly profits, irrespective
of the magnitude of its lead.
Since in a steady state the profit earned by a firm leading by i steps increases
by a constant factor g from one period to the next,11 this property must be
inherited by the value functions. Hence, we must have Vi (j) = g j Vi , where
Vi = Vi (0). We can then rewrite the Bellman equations as follows:
rV1

= max [π1 − X1 V1 + gxℓ1 V2 − cℓ xℓ1 ] ,
xℓ1

...
rVi

= max [πi − Xi Vi + gxℓi Vi+1 − cℓ xℓi ] ,
xℓi

(6)

...
rVm

= max [πM − Xm Vm + gxℓm Vm − cℓ xℓm ] .
xℓm

Consider next a generic outsider that participates in a patent race in an
industry where the leader leads by i steps. If it wins, it obtains a one-step
leadership, the value of which is V1 . Thus, the expected discounted profit of
any individual outsider that invests co g j xoi units of the final good to obtain
innovation j + 1 is
xoi V1 (j + 1) − co gj xoi
.
r + Xi
By the free entry condition, this cannot be positive,12 and if it is negative then

xoi must vanish (and hence XOi ≡ xoi must also vanish). Since this property
1 1 Here

by period we mean the random time interval between two successive innovations.
zero-profit condition in patent races implies that the increase in the net value of the
individuals’ assets must equal aggregate R&D investment:
1 2 The

ȧ(t) = R(t).
Proprietary technological knowledge is the only asset in our model economy. The return to
holding this asset, ra(t), is the extra-profits earned by firms holding market power. Aggregating across firms, this equals
ra(t) = αy(t) − Q(t).
Plugging these equations into the budget constraint (2) one sees that the labour market and
final good market equilibrium conditions are equivalent (Walras’ law), as was claimed earlier.

14
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must hold for all i, we have
gV1 − co ≤ 0 and

m

i=1

XOi



(gV1 − co ) = 0.

A Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the patent race is a list of non-negative
variables (X 1 , X 2 ,..., X m , x ℓ1 , x ℓ2 ,..., x ℓm , V 1 , V 2 ,..., V m ) with xℓi ≤ Xi that
satisfy the Bellman equations (6) and the free entry condition.
Since the variables ω and j do not enter the Bellman equations nor the free
entry condition, in a MPE firms’ strategies cannot depend on ω and j. To see
why this restriction is important, notice that the profitability of each innovation
depends on the expected R&D efforts in the subsequent patent races. Innovators correctly anticipate such future efforts, but the forward-looking nature of
the equilibrium means that expectations could be conditioned on “extraneous”
variables. For example, if firms expect high levels of R&D effort when j is even
and low levels when j is odd, this may turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy
that generates two-period cycles, as in Aghion and Howitt (1992). Firms’ expectations may depend also on ω: for example, an arbitrarily large fraction of
industries may be trapped in a no-growth trap (which is itself a degenerate twoperiod cycle) where nobody invests for fear that its profits will be terminated
soon by the occurrence of the next innovation, as in Cozzi (2007). We have
nothing to add to the analysis of these phenomena here, so we assume Markov
perfection. By requiring that only variables that directly appear in the Bellman
equations can affect firms’ strategies, this assumption rules out cyclical growth
and the possibility that an indeterminate fraction of industries may be trapped
in a no-growth trap.
The next Lemma provides a useful characterization of the steady state MPE
in terms of a set of inequalities and complementary slackness conditions.
Lemma 1 A list of non-negative variables (X1 , X2 ,..., Xm , xℓ1 , xℓ2 ,..., xℓm , V1 ,
V2 ,..., Vm ) such that XOi = Xi − xℓi ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., m is a Markov perfect
15
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patent-race equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the free entry condition

m

gV1 − co ≤ 0 and
XOi (gV1 − co ) = 0

(7)

i=1

and the following inequalities, with the associated complementary slackness conditions :
gVi+1 − Vi − cℓ

≤ 0 and xℓi (gVi+1 − Vi − cℓ ) = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., m − 1 (8)

(g − 1)Vm − cℓ

≤ 0 and xℓm [(g − 1)Vm − cℓ ] = 0.

(9)

Moreover, in any equilibrium
Vi =

πi
r + XOi

i = 1, 2, ..., m.

(10)

With constant returns to scale in R&D, in equilibrium either leaders do not
invest altogether, or they must be indifferent between any level of R&D investment — conditions (8) and (9). These conditions in turn imply that the value of
leading by i steps must equal the expected present value of the corresponding
flow of profits, πi , where the discount rate r is augmented by the probability
that the current leader is replaced. This is condition (10).

3.3

Stability

Partition the set of industries [0, 1] into m sub-sets κi with i = 1, 2, ..., m, where
the leader leads by 1, 2, ..., and m or more steps, respectively. (Later, we
shall show that no leader ever leads by more than m steps in equilibrium.)
The measure of κi is the fraction of industries in which the leader leads by i
steps, which we denote by κi . As new innovations arrive, the sets κi change
continuously. The outflow from state i is the probability that someone innovates,
Xi ; the inflow is, for i > 1, the probability that the leader innovates in state
i − 1 (and also in state m for i = m) and, for i = 1, the probability that an

16

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper425

16

Denicolo and Zanchettin: Leadership Cycles

outsider innovates in any state. Hence we have:
κ̇1

= κ1 XO1 + κ2 XO2 + ... + κm XOm − κ1 X1
...

κ̇i

= κi−1 xℓi−1 − κi Xi

i = 2, ..., m − 1

(11)

......
κ̇m

= κm−1 xℓm−1 + κm xℓm − κm Xm

In a steady state, the κi ’s are constant:
κ̇i = 0

for i = 1, 2, ..., m.

This system provides m − 1 independent equations, as the first equation can be
m

κi = 1,
obtained from the others. Together with the adding-up condition
i=1

these equations can be solved to get:
κ1

=

κi

=

κm

=

1
xℓ1
X2

xℓ1 xℓ2
X2 X3 ...

xℓ

... xℓ

1
m−1
1+
+
+ X2 ...Xm−1
(Xm −xℓm )
xℓ1 ... xℓi−1
κ1
i = 2, ..., m − 1
X2 ...Xi
xℓ1 ... xℓm−1
κ1 .
X2 ...Xm−1 (Xm − xℓm )

(12)

Since in our model there is no capital accumulation, and strategic variables
such as prices and R&D investments can immediately jump to their equilibrium
values, only the κi s adjust gradually after any parameter change, or starting
from arbitrarily given initial conditions. The next result guarantees the stability
of this adjustment process for any possible MPE of the patent race:
Lemma 2 The dynamical system (11) is globally stable.

3.4

The growth rate

Now we calculate the equilibrium rate of growth as a function of R&D investments. Since the equilibrium price depends only on i, substituting (4) into (3)
17
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we get:
1 
1
1
y(t) =
λj(ω,t) α 1−α g j(ω,t) p(j, ω, t)− 1−α
0

= α

α
1−α

m

i=1



α
1−α
p−
i



κi

α

dω



gj(ω,t) dω  .

By the law of large numbers, the probability that the leader has an i-step
advantage is the same across industries. Hence, the variable gj(ω,t) will be
identically distributed over any subset κi , implying:


g

j(ω,t)

dω = κi

1

g j(ω,t) dω.

0

κi

Substituting into the preceding expression we get:

m

α
α
− 1−α
κi pi
y(t) = α 1−α
G(t),

(13)

i=1

where G(t) ≡

1

gj(ω,t) dω is an intermediate good aggregate quality index that

0

increases over time with technical progress.
α

− 1−α
Since the term m
is constant in a steady state, equation (13)
i=1 κi pi
implies that the rate of growth of output is the rate of growth of the average
quality of the intermediate goods, G(t). To calculate it, notice that in an industry where the leader has an i-step advantage, j(ω, t) jumps up to the next
higher integer with a constant instantaneous probability Xi . Hence:
1 
Ġ(t) =
g j(ω,t)+1 − gj(ω,t) X(j + 1, ω, t)dω.
0

Proceeding as before, we obtain
Ġ(t) =

m

i=1

=

m

i=1



(g − 1)Xi




κi

(g − 1)κi Xi

= (g − 1)XG.



g j(ω,t) dω 

1
0



g j(ω,t) dω

18
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where X =

m


κi Xi . It follows that the economy’s rate of growth is

i=1

γ = (g − 1)X.

(14)

In what follows we shall assume that the “transversality” condition
(15)

r>γ

holds; if this inequality is violated, the utility u is unbounded (Barro and Salai-Martin, 2004).

4

Leadership cycles

In this and the following section we focus on the equilibrium where the total
R&D effort in an industry is constant over a leadership cycle, i.e., Xi is independent of i:
Xi = X

for all i = 1, 2, ..., m;

(16)

however, the division of X between the leader and outsiders can vary with i.
Condition (16) may be viewed as imposing a strong form of Markov perfection,
so we call the equilibria that satisfy (16) Strong MPE (SMPE). After characterizing the unique SMPE, we discuss condition (16) more fully in section
6.
To avoid proliferation of cases, before proceeding we impose some parameter
restrictions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with positive R&D
investment by outsiders. First, we rule out persistent leadership equilibria where
only leaders invest in R&D. Lemma 3 shows that these equilibria emerge if the
leader’s R&D advantage is large enough:
Lemma 3 If

co
cℓ

>

g
g−1 ,

there is no MPE in which outsiders invest in R&D.

Thus, we assume:13
1 3 For

a discussion of the special case

co
cℓ

=

g
,
g−1

see Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999).
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co
g
.
<
cℓ
g−1

(17)

Second, we assume that innovation is sufficiently profitable that some research
is conducted at equilibrium:
π1
co
> .
r
g

(18)

If this inequality is violated, the economy stagnates indefinitely.
To state our characterization result we need some more definitions. Let
us recursively calculate the solution to (8), taken as an equality, starting from
V1 =

co
g .

We obtain:
Ṽi ≡

co + cℓ (g + g 2 + ... + g i−1 )
.
gi

Ṽi increases with co , cℓ and i and decreases with g. It is also useful to note the
following Lemma:

Lemma 4 The ratio

πi
is either decreasing, or first increasing and then deṼi

creasing in i.

Finally, define
∗

i = arg

max

i=1,2,...,m




πi
.
Ṽi

We are now ready to state:
Proposition 1 There is a unique Strong Markov Perfect Equilibrium outcome.
In equilibrium, outsiders and all leaders ℓi with i < i∗ invest in R&D simultaneously, whereas ℓi∗ does not invest, so no leader ever leads by more than i∗
steps. The aggregate R&D effort is:
X=

πi∗
− r,
Ṽi∗

(19)
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and the leaders’ R&D efforts are
xℓi =

πi∗
πi
−
for i ≤ i∗ ,
Ṽi∗
Ṽi

(20)

so that Vi = Ṽi for i ≤ i∗ .
The variable i∗ can be thought of as the maximum “length” of leadership
cycles. When i∗ = 1, leadership cycles are degenerate, and the SMPE actually reproduces the familiar leapfrogging equilibrium. Obviously, i∗ cannot
be greater than one when innovations are drastic, i.e., m = 1. This confirms
that with drastic innovations there is no equilibrium in which the leader and
outsiders simultaneously invest in R&D — a point made by Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999). However, when innovations are non drastic (m ≥ 2) there always
exists a non empty region of parameters values where leadership cycles are non
degenerate. From the definition of i∗ it follows immediately that for any given
m ≥ 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for i∗ to be greater than one is
gπ1
gπ2 −π1

<

co
cℓ

<

g
g−1 .

More generally, we have (the proof is in the Appendix):

Corollary 1. The maximum length of leadership cycles, i∗ , increases with
and approaches m as

co
cℓ

goes to

co
cℓ

g
g−1 .

The intuitive reason why both the leader and outsiders can simultaneously
invest in R&D is as follows. Leaders are more efficient than outsiders in conducting research. With non drastic innovations, they also obtain greater profits
than outsiders if they innovate repeatedly, as they are less severely constrained
by outside competition in the product market. However, leaders have a lower
incentive to innovate since only the incremental profit (i.e., the difference over
the current profit) matters for them. This is Arrow’s replacement effect.
In our model, the magnitute of Arrow’s effect is endogenous, as it depends
on the division of the total R&D among the leader and outsiders. Thus, if the
leader’s cost advantage is neither too large nor too small, it can be exaclty offset
21
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by Arrow’s effect. However, if the leader innovates repeatedly, its profits increase
and thus Arrow’s effect tends to strengthen, reducing the leader’s incentive to
invest in R&D. As a result, the leader’s share in the total R&D done must
decrease. This is proved formally in the following:
Corollary 2. In the SMPE, xℓi−1 > xℓi for i ≤ i∗ .
πi
increases with i for
Ṽi
i ≤ i∗ (this follows by Lemma 4 and the definition of i∗ ). After i∗ successive
The Corollary follows immediately from (20) noting that

innovations Arrow’s effect becomes so strong as to prevail over the R&D cost
effect. The leader then stops investing in R&D altogether and is overtaken with
probability one, and a new cycle starts.
The model is consistent with the empirical evidence that while a significant
share of innovations is achieved by outsiders, incumbents account for much of
the research done and often innovate repeatedly in the same industry. Scherer
(1980), for instance, discusses survey evidence that industry leaders make significant R&D investment to improve their existing products. By innovating
repeatedly over time, these incumbents may obtain a large competitive advantage over outsiders. Segerstrom (2007) amply documents the phenomenon.
A remarkable property of the equilibrium is that the hazard rate X depends
only on the profit accruing to leaders that lead by i∗ steps and is independent
of whatever profits leaders may earn before. This seems surprising at first, since
the incentive to innovate should reflect the expected present value of all profits
earned over an innovator’s life cycle. The intuitive explanation is that with
constant returns to scale in research all “intermediate” profits (i.e., the profits
obtained by incumbents that lead by less than i∗ steps) are dissipated in the
patent races which they participate in.
To see this point more clearly, recall that with constant returns to scale in
research incumbents are indifferent between any amount of R&D investment as
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long as i < i∗ (equation (8)). Imagine, then, an hypothetical outsider that, after
having innovated for the first time, keeps investing in R&D at an arbitrarily large
rate so as to achieve the subsequent i∗ − 1 innovations almost instantaneously,
and then stops investing. The expected present profit guaranteed by such a
strategy is
∗

gi π i∗
,
X +r
i.e., the discounted profit of leading by i∗ steps until somebody else innovates.
Intermediate profits do not matter here, as they are earned for arbitrarily short
periods of time. On the other hand, the effective unit R&D cost of achieving
i∗ consecutive innovations (the first as an outsider and the others, in infinitely
rapid succession, as a leader) is14
Ci∗ ≡ co + cℓ (g + g2 + ... + gi

∗

−1

).

The standard zero-profit condition in a patent race with free entry then becomes
∗

g i π i∗
= Ci∗ .
X +r
∗

Noting that Ci∗ = gi Ṽi∗ , one sees immediately that this condition is equivalent
to (19). Of course, in equilibrium incumbents do not follow the hypothetical
strategy described above, but their payoff must be the same as if they did, since
they must be indifferent between any amount of R&D investment.
Another remarkable property of the leadership cycle dynamics is that, in innovative industries, the quality-adjusted price stays constant after each successive innovation by the leader, but jumps down when an outsider innovates. This
implies that the leader alone benefits from technical progress, reaping higher and
1 4 The

total discounted cost is
∗

co +

xℓ1 ... xℓi∗ −1 g i −1 cℓ
xℓ1 gcℓ
xℓ1 xℓ2 g 2 cℓ

 + ... + 
.
+
 
xℓ1 + r xℓ2 + r
xℓ1 + r
xℓ1 + r ... xℓi∗ −1 + r

Letting the xℓi go to infinity, the expression in the text follows.
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higher profits, as long as it continues to innovate. But when it is replaced by
a new entrant, the cumulated benefits from all its past innovations eventually
accrue to consumers. With a continuum of industries, however, this effect is
smoothed out in the aggregate, so consumption grows smoothly.15
The model endogenously generates firms heterogeneity, as incumbents may
lead by different numbers of steps. More precisely, the modal lead size is 1, and
greater leads are less frequent:
Corollary 3. In the SMPE, κ1 > κ2 > ... > κi∗ > 0 = κi∗ +1 = ... = κm .
This follows immediately from (12) and Corollary 2. Measuring firm size by its
market value, it appears that the firm size distribution depends not only on the
distribution of i but also on the distribution of j, the number of innovations
achieved in sector ω by time t, since Vi (j, ω, t) = Vi gj(ω,t) . The variable j(ω, t)
is distributed identically across sectors, with density
e−Xt (Xt)j
,
j!
which eventually decreases with j. Taken together, this observation and Corollary 3 imply a skewed firm size distribution, which again is consistent with
empirical evidence.16
1 5 It is now easy to see that the assumption of a linear utility function can be relaxed without
affecting the main results. For example, with a concave instantaneous utility function like

 ∞
c(t)1−θ − 1 −ρt
u(c) =
e
dt,
1−θ
0

where ρ is the rate of time preference and 1/θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the Euler equation
ċ(t)
r−ρ
γ=
=
c(t)
θ
provides an increasing relationship between the interest rate and the economy’s rate of growth
γ. Proposition 1 provides another, decreasing relationship — which can be obtained by plugging
(19) into (14). These two equations can then be simultaneously solved to determine the
equilibrium interest rate and growth rate.
1 6 See, for instance, the classical work of Steindl (1965), or the more recent contribution
by Cabral and Mata (2003). One must caution, however, that in real world much of firm
heterogeneity seems to be associated with differences in productivity across firms that are
active in the same industry, whereas in our model only incumbents are active.
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While other models can explain these first stylized facts, a specific prediction
of ours is the negative correlation between firm size (or age) and growth. To
see how this emerges in our model, notice that both firm size (measured again
by its value Vi ) and firm average time from birth (i.e., from its first innovation)
are positively correlated with i. The negative correlation with the growth rate
then follows by the next result:
Corollary 4. An incumbent firm’s expected rate of growth decreases with the
size of its lead, i.
The proof is simple: the expected rate of growth of a firm’s value is
xℓi g Ṽi+1 − Ṽi
.
Ṽi
Ṽi+1
and xℓi decrease with i. Corollary 4
Ṽi
means that Gibrat’s law does not hold in our model, and the pattern of deviation
This decreases with i because both

seems consistent with empirical evidence: see for instance Hall (1987), Evans
(1987) and, more recently, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2005) and Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006).

5

Innovation policy and growth

In this section we use the model to address several policy issues. We are especially interested in ascertaining whether policy should favour R&D investment
by leaders or by outsiders. Although we focus on R&D taxes and subsidies
and on certain specific patent policies, this question may have broader policy
implications (for example, in competition policy).

5.1

Backward patent protection

In the baseline model we have assumed that nobody can imitate an innovation
without infringing the patent that covers it (complete backward protection).
25
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In real life, backward protection is limited both in length and in breadth. To
avoid the technical difficulties of modeling a finite patent life in continuous
time, we continue to assume that patent life is infinite,17 focusing on patent
breadth. Following Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), we model patent breadth as a
cap on the price that the patent-holder is allowed to charge.18 This captures
the notion that when imitation is, to some extent, tolerated, the leader faces
stronger competitive pressure from outsiders.
The profit accruing to a leader ℓi that faces a price cap p̂i < min[λi , α1 ] is
1

1
− 1−α

π̂i = (p̂i − 1)α 1−α p̂i

.

One can then distinguish between two cases. Backward patent protection is
uniform when the ratio between the profit collected by the patent-holder, π̂i ,
and the profit with complete protection, πi , is constant:
π̂i = µπ i

for all i with µ ∈ [0, 1].

In this case, the policy-maker chooses µ, and the p̂i s then are uniquely determined. Backward protection is state-dependent when the policy-maker chooses
the prices p̂i independently of each other, so that the strength of protection can
depend on the size of the leader’s technological advantage, as in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2008).
In both cases, the equilibrium is still given by Proposition 1 after replacing the πi s with the π̂i s. It follows immediately that with uniform patents,
strengthening backward protection (i.e., increasing µ) always increases X, and
hence the economy’s rate of growth.19 Since X increases faster than µ while
1 7 To

circumvent these difficulties, one could model patent life as a constant probability that
the patent expires, as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008). However, this requires the additional
assumption that the patents covering all past innovations expire when the patent on the latest
innovation does.
1 8 For a discussion of alternative interpretations of patent breadth see Denicolò (1996).
1 9 However, strengthening backward patent protection clearly worsens static efficiency. Here
we do not analyze the optimal resolution to the trade off between static and dynamic efficiency,
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the xℓi s are proportional to µ, it follows also that strengthening backward protection decreases the share of R&D done by leaders. Thus, in this case the
growth-enhancing policy favours outsiders more than leaders.
The case of state-dependent patents is different. Since the equilibrium total
R&D effort X depends only on πi∗ , only changes in p̂i∗ affect the economy’s
rate of growth, and the qualitative effect is the same as for uniform patents.
A decrease in any p̂i with i < i∗ now has no effect on the rate of growth (as
long as i∗ does not change). However, such a decrease reduces π̂i and hence
increases xℓi , as is clear from (20). This trickle-down effect, which has been first
identified by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008), is due to Arrow’s replacement effect:
all else equal, the lower is the leader’s current profit, the greater is its incentive
to innovate. Differently from Acemoglu and Akcigit, however, in our model such
greater R&D investment by leader ℓi (when i < i∗ ) is exactly offset by lower
R&D investment by outsiders. This crowding-out effect, which operates on a
one-to-one basis, means that reducing patent protection granted to leaders that
lead by less than i∗ steps has no impact on growth.20

5.2

Forward protection

The baseline model assumes that no innovation infringes on previous patents,
so innovators need not obtain any licence from previous patent holders to practice their innovations (no forward patent protection). The patent literature has
highlighted the possibility that granting some forward protection may be desirable when innovation is cumulative and intertemporal externalities arise (see
Scotchmer, 2004, for an excellent discussion). Thus, let us now assume that
as it inevitably requires an estimate of the elasticity of the supply of inventions, which is
notoriously difficult and controversial. In our framework, the analysis is further complicated
by the model’s transitional dynamics.
2 0 However, it can impact social welfare. More precisely, there are three effects of lower
p̂i ’s on welfare. First, lower prices directly improve static allocative efficiency. However, by
increasing the share of R&D done by leaders, they increase the fraction of industries in which
the leader leads by more than i steps, which is bad for allocative efficiency. Finally, the
increase in the share of R&D done by leaders improves aggregate R&D efficiency.
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innovation j in industry ω infringes on the patent covering innovation j − 1 in
that industry (but, for simplicity, not on that covering innovation j − 2). This
implies that any successful outsider must pay a licensing fee to the previous
incumbent, whereas no payment is due if the leader innovates repeatedly.
We take the size of the licensing fee as our policy variable.21 More precisely,
we assume that the licensing fee to be paid by innovator j is ρg j , where ρ is set
by policy (e.g., by the courts in case of patent infringement), whereas the term
gj guarantees that the fee is a constant share of the value of the innovation — a
necessary condition for the existence of a steady state.22
With forward patent protection, the Bellman equation for leader ℓi becomes
rVi = max [π i − Xi Vi + ρXOi + gxℓi Vi+1 − cℓ xℓi ] ,
xℓi

since the current leader obtains a payment of ρgj when it is replaced. Likewise,
the free entry condition becomes
gV1 − ρ − co ≤ 0,
since a successful outsider that obtains innovation j must pay the licensing fee
ρgj . Lemma 3 continues to hold with co + ρ replacing co , so condition (17) now
becomes
g
co + ρ
<
.
cℓ
g−1
This places an upper bound on ρ: when ρ exceeds this threshold, outsiders do
not invest in R&D. Focusing on values of ρ that lie strictly below the threshold,
2 1 In a model of variable innovation size, O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) posit that the
policymaker sets the size of the innovation beyond which there is no patent infringement.
Another difference between their analysis and ours is that in case of infringement they allow
the successive patent holders to collude, whereas we assume that after paying the licensing
fee, the latest innovator continues to compete against the penultimate one.
2 2 Like backward protection, forward patent protection could be state-dependent in our
model, in which case ρ would depend on i. However, this complicates the analysis considerably,
since the free-entry condition would now depend on i. Therefore, we leave this extension for
future work. See Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) for an analysis of state-dependent forward
patent protection in a different framework.
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it follows as in Proposition 1 that in equilibrium outsiders must invest in R&D,
so the free entry condition must hold as an equality:
co + ρ
(≡ V̂1 ).
g

V1 =

Since conditions (8) do not change, we can again calculate the solution to (8)
recursively, obtaining now
V̂i = Ṽi +

ρ
.
gi

Finally, equations (10) now become
Vi =

πi + ρXOi
.
r + XOi

From the above discussion it is clear that Proposition 1 continues to hold
with the following changes (the structure of the proof is identical to that of
Proposition 1 and thus the proof is omitted).
Proposition 2 For each 0 ≤ ρ <

g
g−1 cℓ

− co there is a unique Strong Markov

Perfect Equilibrium outcome. In equilibrium,
X=

πi∗ − rV̂i∗
,
V̂i∗ − ρ

where now
i∗ = arg

max

i=1,2,...,m




πi − rV̂i
.
V̂i − ρ

Leader ℓi∗ does not invest, so no leader ever leads by more than i∗ steps. For
i ≤ i∗ the leaders’ R&D efforts are
xℓi =

πi∗ − rV̂i∗
πi − rV̂i
−
,
∗
V̂i − ρ
V̂i − ρ

so that Vi = V̂i for i = 1, ..., i∗ .
Using Proposition 2, we can easily trace out the effects of an increase in
forward patent protection ρ. It can be checked that increasing ρ increases the
29
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length of leadership cycles i∗ and the share of R&D conducted by leaders. The
effect on the growth rate, however, is ambiguous. To be precise, we have
Corollary 4. An increase in forward protection ρ increases the economy’s rate
of growth if and only if
X
1
> i∗ ,
X +r
g

(21)

or, in terms of exogenous variables only, if and only if
r
π i∗
>
.
1
−
g −i∗
∗
Ṽi

When i∗ = 1, condition (21) can never be met. In other words, in the familiar
leapfrogging equilibrium granting forward patent protection is always bad for
innovation and growth.23 The economic intuition is simple: each innovator
obtains ρg when it is replaced by the occurrence of the next innovation, but it
must pay the licensing fee ρ when it succeeds. The net effect on the incentive
to innovate is unambiguously negative because the two payments are the same
in magnitude, except that the later term is higher because of growth of the
economy, but must be discounted. The transversality condition (15) implies that
discounting prevails over growth, so the effect of granting forward protection is
negative.
When i∗ > 1, however, increasing ρ can be good for growth. The intuitive
reason is that in equilibrium the incentive to innovate is the same as if a new
leader reached the subsequent i∗ − 1 innovations instantaneously, as we have
∗

seen above. When such leader is eventually replaced, it now obtains ρg i , but
this payoff is discounted only for one period (as the length of the other i∗ − 1
periods is arbitrarily small). This magnifies the positive effect of ρ on growth,
2 3 This result accords with O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004). They actually find that
forward protection can be good for growth if it facilitates collusion. Ruling out collusion,
however, the effect is unambiguously negative in their model.
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without changing the negative effect. As a result, the net effect can now be
positive even if the transversality condition holds. The greater is the maximum
length of leadership cycles, the more likely the effect of forward protection on
growth is positive.

5.3

R&D policy

Consider now R&D policy. We analyze a balanced-budget policy move: the
policymaker taxes R&D expenditures by the leaders at rate τ and uses the
revenue to subsidize R&D expenditures by outsiders at rate σ. When τ and σ
are negative, the leaders’ R&D is subsidized, the outsiders’ taxed.
The effective unit R&D costs of leaders and outsiders then become c′ℓ =
cℓ (1 + τ ) and c′o = co (1 − σ). The government budget constraint is

i∗
i∗


κi xℓi = σco X −
κi xℓi .
τcℓ
i=1

i=1

Notice that R&D taxes and subsidies affect only the unit R&D costs. Hence,

replacing cℓ and co with c′ℓ and c′o , respectively, all of our results hold verbatim.
Consider, then, the effect of an increase in τ on the economy’s rate of growth,
assuming that
co (1 − σ)
g
<
cℓ (1 + τ )
g−1
so that Proposition 1 applies. We have:
Proposition 3 Taxing R&D expenditure by leaders to subsidize R&D expenditure by outsiders reduces the economy’s rate of growth.
Proposition 3 suggests that R&D policy should favour leaders, not outsiders.24 This objective could be achieved also with other policy tools, such
as competition policy.
2 4 While reducing τ is good for growth, it is however bad for allocative efficiency. The reason
is that decreasing τ increases the xℓi s, increasing the fraction of industries in which the leader
leads by more than one step, and hence prices are higher. However, the increase in the share
of R&D done by the leaders improves aggregate R&D efficiency.
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6

Indeterminacy and equilibrium selection

So far we have focused on the unique SMPE, where the total R&D effort Xi
is independent of the size of the incumbent’s lead i. Dropping condition (16),
however, other MPE may arise. In this section we demonstrate that there is a
continuum of MPE and discuss the source of this indeterminacy. We also argue
that all the MPE exhibit a pattern of leadership cycling, but the SMPE is the
most natural solution.
To illustrate the indeterminacy, let us focus on the case of “quasi-drastic”
innovations, where it takes a two-step lead to engage in monopoly pricing (that
is, m = 2). Then, one can easily see that there exists a continuum of MPE. In
all of these equilibria, we have xℓ2 = 0, XO1 =
g 2 πM
co +gcℓ

gπ1
co

− r ≥ 0 and XO2 = X2 =

− r ≥ 0. However, xℓ1 can range from 0 to ∞, and, correspondingly,

X = κ1 X1 + κ2 X2 can range from XO1 to 2XO2 . (The reason why X stays
finite in the limit is that κ1 tends to zero, and κ1 X1 tends to XO2 ).25
A similar problem arises when m > 2, but now several variables (i.e., all the
xℓi ’s for i < m) can be indeterminate for certain parameter values. In all MPE,
however, the outsiders’ aggregate R&D effort is fully determined.26 Hence, the
indeterminacy arises only when, with constant returns to R&D, both leaders
and outsiders simultaneously invest in R&D.
Mathematically, the reason why multiple MPE equilibria exist is that for
each i < m the model has two unknowns, XOi and xℓi , but while there is a
ℓ
show that these are, indeed, MPE’s, it suffices to set V1 = cgo and V2 = co +gc
and
g2
check that all the necessary and sufficient conditions in Lemma 1 hold. In particular, V1 = cgo

2 5 To

ℓ
implies that outsiders are indifferent between investing and not; V2 = co +gc
then implies
g2
that condition (8) holds as an equality for ℓ1 , so ℓ1 too is indifferent between investing in R&D
or not. Thus, xℓ1 can take any non-negative value. For example, the familiar leapfrogging
solution where xℓ1 = 0 is an MPE. As xℓ1 increases, κ2 increases and hence X = κ1 X1 +κ2 X2
can change without impairing the equilibrium conditions. Thus, we have a continuum of MPE.
2 6 That is, greater investment in R&D by leaders does not crowd out investment by outsiders.
This property depends on the assumption of linear utility: with a concave instantaneous utility
function there would be the indirect crowding out caused by the increase in the equilibrium
interest rate associated with the increase in X (a general equilibrium effect).
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separate equilibrium condition for each leader ℓi , there is only one free-entry
condition for all outsiders, since the reward to a successful outsider is always
V1 . This implies that there are not enough equilibrium conditions to pin down
a unique equilibrium.
From an economic point of view, the indeterminacy is due to the forwardlooking nature of the equilibrium. This creates the possibility of self-fulfilling
prophecies conditioned on extraneous variables, as discussed in subsection 3.2.
By focusing on MPE, we have ruled out the possibility that the equilibrium may
be conditioned on t, j or ω. But in our framework i is a payoff-relevant state
variable, so the MPE can depend on i.
However, we contend that there are good reasons to focus on the (unique)
SMPE, and that, at any rate, all the MPE exhibit a pattern of leadership cycling.
One reason why the SMPE is more likely to prevail is that the other MPE are
implicitly based on “over-pessimistic” or “over-optimistic” expectations. To see
why, consider for instance the leapfrogging solution where X1 = X =

gπ1
co

−r

and xℓ1 = 0. This is always a MPE. The intuitive reason is that if XO2 is
expected to be sufficiently large, V2 will be small enough that gV2 − V1 − cℓ
is negative. This makes it optimal for ℓ1 not to invest in R&D and supports
the leapfrogging solution as a MPE. In a Strong MPE, however, XO2 cannot
be expected to be larger than X =

gπ1
co

− r,27 so the leapfrogging solution can

satisfy condition (16) only for a certain range of parameter values (to be precise,
when

co
cℓ

<

gπ1
gπ2 −π1 ).

From this viewpoint, the role of condition (16) is to rule

out over-pessimistic (as well as over-optimistic) beliefs that are conditioned on
the payoff relevant variable i, and thus are not ruled out by Markov perfection,
but are economically arbitrary.
Another reason for focusing on SMPE is based on the idea that the equi2 7 Notice

that condition (16) requires not only that the aggregate R&D effort Xi is independent of i for values of i that are actually reached in equilibrium, but also for those values
of i that cannot ever be reached because xℓs = 0 for some s < i.
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librium should be robust to the introduction of a small degree of decreasing
returns into the R&D technology at the industry level. To see why this robustness criterion yields condition (16), assume that the instantaneous probability
xs
of success by a generic firm s is
h(Xi ), where h(.) is an increasing and conXi
cave function that represents the aggregate probability of success. The case of
constant returns corresponds to h(Xi ) = Xi . With this R&D technology, the
free-entry condition by outsiders requires that
xoi
Xi

h(Xi )V1 (j) − co g j−1 xoi
r + h(Xi )

is non-positive and is zero if outsiders invest in R&D. Thus, in a free entry
equilibrium the following condition must hold:
h(Xi )
co
=
.
Xi
gV1
Since the right-hand side of this equation is constant, Xi must be independent
of i. This property holds for any concave function h(Xi ), and hence it must
hold also in the equilibrium that is the limit of the decreasing returns equilibria
as h(Xi ) → Xi .
In any case, the next Proposition shows that in all MPE leaders necessarily
stop investing in R&D altogether after a finite number of successive innovations
that cannot be greater than m, so all MPE exhibit a pattern of leadership
cycling:
Proposition 4 In any MPE, xℓi = 0 for some i ≤ m. Thus, no leader ever
leads by more than m steps.

7

Conclusion

We have analyzed a tractable quality-ladder model of endogenous growth where
the latest innovator is more efficient than any outsider in conducting the research for the next innovation. The model generates a rich set of predictions
34
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that can help reconcile theory and empirical evidence. It generates stochastic
leadership cycles where both the industry leader and outsiders simultaneously
invest in R&D in the same industry. Leaders can innovate several successive
times, but their share in the total R&D done decreases as the size of their
technological lead increases. This dynamics endogenously generates a skewed
firms size distribution and implies a deviation from Gibrat’s law that is confirmed by the empirical evidence. We have also used the model to analyze the
effect of various patent and R&D policies on growth, showing that in some cases
the growth-enhancing policy must favour R&D investment by the leader, not
outsiders.
To isolate the source of these new predictions, we have retained the same
basic modelling structure as first-generation quality-ladder models, assuming
only that leaders have an R&D cost advantage over outsiders. But we believe
that leadership cycles can be reproduced in the many models that have extended
early Schumpeterian theories of endogenous growth in all sorts of ways. For
example, scale effects can be eliminated as in Segerstrom (2007). By modeling
innovations of variable size, one could account for an additional important source
of firms heterogeneity (Minniti et al., 2009). Assuming that competition is
less intense than Bertrand competition, one could produce equilibria in which
not only incumbents can innovate repeatedly, but they are also displaced only
gradually when they stop innovating, as in Denicolò and Zanchettin (2009).
It would also be interesting to complement our policy analysis by studying
the effect of R&D and patent policy on social welfare, not only on growth. This
requires finding the optimal resolution to the trade off between static and dynamic efficiency, which depends on the elasticity of the supply of inventions.
To address this issue, it is therefore essential to allow for decreasing returns to
R&D at the industry level, which however complicates the analysis. An additional complication is the model’s transitional dynamics. Although analytical
35
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results seem to be out of reach, it should be possible to calibrate the model and
solve for the optimal policy numerically. This analysis is left for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Sufficiency is obvious, so we focus on necessity. Notice
that for all i = 1, 2, ..., m − 1 the maximand in the Bellman equation can be
rewritten as
π i − (XOi + xℓi ) Vi + gxℓi Vi+1 − cℓ xℓi ,
and hence is linear in xℓi for any given XOi . As a consequence, the following
inequality must hold
gVi+1 − Vi − cℓ ≤ 0,
for otherwise Vi is unbounded, which cannot happen equilibrium. Moreover, xℓi
can be positive only if condition gVi+1 −Vi − cℓ ≤ 0 holds as an equality, whence
the complementary slackness conditions
xℓi (gVi+1 − Vi − cℓ ) = 0
follow. This proves equation (8).
For i = m, the analogous condition is
(g − 1)Vm − cℓ ≤ 0,
with the associated complementary slackness condition xℓm [(g − 1)Vm − cℓ ] =
0, whence (9) follows.
Finally, from the complementary slackness conditions it follows immediately
that the system of Bellman equations (6) reduces to
rV1

= π1 − XO1 V1

rV2

= π2 − XO2 V2
...

rVm

= πM − XOm Vm .
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These equations then can be solved to get (10). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Neglecting the first dynamic equation, which is implied
by the others, the dynamical system becomes
κ̇2

= (1 − κ2 − κ3 − ... − κm )xℓ1 − κ2 X2

κ̇3

= κ2 xℓ2 − κ3 X3
...

κ̇m

= κm−1 xℓm−1 − κm Xm

where we have used the fact that xℓm = 0 (see Proposition 1 below). The Lemma
could be proved by applying the Routh-Hurwitz conditions to the characteristic
equation of the associated autonomous system, but since this mechanical proof
is very tedious we provide a more intuitive proof. This starts from the observation that since κ̇i ≥ 0 when κi = 0, none of the κi s can become negative.
Moreover, since κ2 + ... + κm = 1 − κ1 , all the κi are necessarily bounded, so the
characteristic equation cannot have roots with positive real parts. To complete
the proof, it then suffices to show that there cannot be zero or imaginary roots.
To show this, notice that the characteristic polynomial Cm is recursively defined
as C2 = λ + (X2 + xℓ1 ) and
Ci+1 (λ) = (λ + Xi+1 )Ci (λ) + xℓi xℓi−1 ...xℓ1 .
This implies that all the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial are strictly
positive. As is well know, this suffices to rule out zero or imaginary roots,
implying that all roots of the characteristic equation have negative real parts.

Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that outsiders invest in R&D.
By (8), this requires that
V1 =

co
.
g
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Clearly, in equilibrium we must have V2 ≥ V1 , since a firm leading by two steps
can always mimic a firm leading by one step only. This condition implies
gV2 − V1 − cℓ

≥ (g − 1)V1 − cℓ
=

It follows that

co
cℓ

>

g
g−1

g−1
co − cℓ .
g

implies that gV2 − V1 − cℓ > 0. But this violates (8).

This contradiction establishes that when

co
cℓ

>

g
g−1

there is no equilibrium in

which outsiders invest in R&D. 
Proof of Lemma 4. For simplicity we treat i as a continuous variable. Direct
πi
calculation shows that the derivative of the ratio
with respect to i has the
Ṽi
same sign as

co
i
(g − 1) − g + g i − αg α .
cℓ


When i = 0, H reduces to (1 − α) ccoℓ − 1 (g − 1) and hence is positive. Thus,


dH
i
the ratio πṼi initially increases with i. But
= gi − g α log g < 0, implying
i
di
that πṼi is quasi-concave in i if i is treated as a continuous variable. The Lemma
H = (1 − α)



i

then follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the proposition, we show that the list of
variables
X
xℓi
xℓi

πi∗
− r,
Ṽi∗
πi∗
πi
=
−
for i = 1, ..., i∗
∗
Ṽi
Ṽi
= 0 for i = i∗ , ..., m
=

Vi

= Ṽi for i = 1, ..., i∗

Vi

=

πi
Ṽi∗ for i = i∗ , ..., m
πi∗

satisfies the conditions stated in Lemma 1; condition (16) is obviously met.
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Notice first of all that since by definition of i∗ we have
X≥

πi∗
Ṽi∗

≥

π̃1
,
Ṽ1

it follows

π̃ 1
−r >0
Ṽ1

where the last inequality holds by condition (18). Next, it is clear that xℓi ≥ 0
for all i = 1, ..., m, again by definition of i∗ . Finally, notice that
XOi =
by quasi-concavity of

πi
Ṽi

πi
π̃ 1
−r ≥
− r > 0 for i = 1, ..., i∗ ,
Ṽi
Ṽ1

and (17), while obviously XOi = X > 0 for i = i∗ , ..., m.

Thus, all R&D investments are non negative.
By construction, at the candidate equilibrium the outsiders’ zero-profit condition (7) and condition (8) for i = 1, ..., i∗ − 1 hold as an equality. It is also
immediate to check that condition (10), which becomes
Vi =

πi
r+

πi
Ṽi

−r

= Ṽi ,

is met for i = 1, ..., i∗ . Thus, it remains to check conditions (8) for i = i∗ , ..., m−
1, condition (9), and condition (10) for i = i∗ + 1, ..., m.
Since XOi =

πi∗
Ṽi∗

− r for i = i∗ , ..., m, condition (10) is immediate. Next, we

show that conditions (8) hold as strict inequalities. It suffices to show that
gVi+1 − Vi < g Ṽi+1 − Ṽi = cℓ
when i = i∗ , ..., m − 1. At the candidate equilibrium, this inequality becomes


π i+1
πi
Ṽi∗ g
−
< g Ṽi+1 − Ṽi ,
π i∗
π i∗
which rewrites as
g

πi+1 Ṽi+1
−
π i∗
Ṽi∗

or
gπi+1

Ṽi+1
Ṽi∗
−
πi+1 πi∗





<

πi
Ṽi
−
,
π i∗
Ṽi∗

> πi

Ṽi
Ṽi∗
−
π i π i∗



.

40

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper425

40

Denicolo and Zanchettin: Leadership Cycles

This inequality always holds since g > 1, πi+1 > πi , and
concavity of

πi
Ṽi

Ṽi+1
πi+1

>

Ṽi
πi

by quasi-

(see the proof of Lemma 4) and the fact that i ≥ i∗ .

Finally, consider condition (9). We must show that
(g − 1)

πm
Ṽi∗ < cℓ .
π i∗

Notice first of all that
(g − 1)Ṽm < cℓ ,
since this inequality rewrites as


co −m
1 − g − (g − 1)
g
<1
cℓ
which is obviously true when

co
cℓ

<

g
g−1 .

Since

πm
Ṽi∗ ≤ Ṽm
π i∗
by definition of i∗ , if it clear that condition (14) also holds as a strict inequality.
This completes the proof that the candidate equilibrium is, indeed, a Strong
MPE.
Now we turn to uniqueness. Proposition 4 below shows that in any MPE,
xℓm = 0. Denote by ı̄ the smallest integer such that xℓı̄ = 0. Proposition 1
implies also that outsiders must do some research, so condition V1 = Ṽ1 =

co
g

must hold. One can then iteratively solve conditions (8), which must then hold
as equalities for i = 1, ...,ı̄ − 1, obtaining
Vi = Ṽi for i = 1, ..., ı̄.
Since xℓı̄ = 0, equation (10) at i = ı̄ yields:
Xı̄ =

πı̄
− r.
Ṽı̄

Xi =

πı̄
−r
Ṽı̄

Then, in a SMPE we must have
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for all i = 1, ..., m. Now suppose that there is an equilibrium in which ı̄ = i∗ .
We show that this assumption leads to a contradiction.
We must distinguish between two cases. If ı̄ > i∗ , then Vi∗ = Ṽi∗ . Equation
(10) at i = i∗ gives
XOi∗ =

π i∗
− r > Xi∗ ,
Ṽi∗

which is impossible as it would imply xℓi∗ < 0. If ı̄ < i∗ , since XOı̄+1 ≤ Xı̄+1 =
πı̄
− r, from equation (10) we obtain the following inequality
Ṽı̄
Vı̄+1 ≥

πı̄+1
Ṽı̄ .
πı̄

On the other hand by quasi-concavity of

πi
Ṽi

and ı̄ < i∗ we get

π ı̄
πı̄+1
<
.
Ṽı̄
Ṽı̄+1
Combining these two inequalities we finally get
Vı̄+1 > Ṽı̄+1 ,
violating condition (8) for i = ı̄.
This contradiction shows that ı̄ must be equal to i∗ , which implies that the
equilibrium is unique. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Again, we treat i as a continuous variable. The ratio
πi
Ṽi

achieves its maximum at i∗ where

H = (1 − α)
Since

dH
di




co
i
(g − 1) − g + g i − αg α = 0.
cℓ



i
= g i − g α log g < 0, by implicit differentiation we have that

has the same sign as

∂H
∂ cco

= (1−α)(g−1) > 0. Next, notice that when

ℓ

co
cℓ

→

∂i∗
∂ cco
ℓ

g
g−1 ,

i

H → gi − αg α , so equation H = 0 becomes
g

1−α ∗
α i

=

1
,
α
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or
∗

λi =

1
,
α

which implies i∗ = m by the definition of m. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose for the time being that a change in τ does
not change i∗ . Since R&D policy does not affect the πi s, we have




dX
dṼi∗
sign
= sign −
.
dτ
dτ
Now Ṽi∗ is given by
Ṽi∗

co (1 − σ) + cℓ (1 + τ)(g + g2 + ... + gi
=
g i∗

∗

−1

)

.

To proceed, we now show that in equilibrium
i∗
i=1 κi xℓi
= 1 − κ1 ,
X
i.e., the share of R&D conducted by leaders is equal to the share of industries
in which the leader leads by more than one step. To show this, notice that
xℓi∗ = 0, so from (12) we get
i∗
xℓ ∗
xℓ
xℓ
i=1 κi xℓi
= κ1 1 + κ2 2 + ... + κi∗ −1 i −1 .
X
X
X
X
x

From (12) one gets also κi+1 = Xℓi κi , so the above equation rewrites as
i∗
i=1 κi xℓi
= κ2 + κ3 + ... + κi∗
X
= 1 − κ1 .

Using this result, the government’s budget constraint can be rewritten as
σ=

cℓ 1 − κ1
τ.
co κ1

Totally differentiating Ṽi∗ with respect to τ , taking into account that s is given
by the above expression, we get

∗ 

dṼi∗
cℓ g−i  
t dκ1
i∗ −1
=
κ1 1 + g + ... + g
−1 +
dτ
κ1
κ1 dτ
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The term inside square brackets is positive since
1
1
xℓ1 ... xℓi∗ −1 ≥ i∗
xℓ1
xℓ1 xℓ2
1+
+
+ ... +
X
X2
X i∗ −1


∗
and 1 + g + ... + gi −1 ≥ i∗ , whence it is clear that
κ1 =



∗
κ1 1 + g + ... + gi −1 ≥ 1,

with a strict inequality if i∗ ≥ 2. The second term inside curly brackets is also
obviously positive, since an increase in τ with a corresponding increase in σ
raises the leaders’ R&D cost and reduces the outsiders’, and this must increase
the share of R&D done by outsiders. Thus, the direct effect of an increase in τ
on the rate of growth, holding i∗ constant, is negative.
To complete the proof, notice that X depends on τ also through i∗ , as i∗
jumps down at certain critical points where
π i∗
πi∗ −1
=
Ṽi∗
Ṽi∗ −1
as τ increases. Thus, X is differentiable with respect to τ only piecewise. But X
is continuous in τ at those critical points. As a result, if the partial derivative of
Ṽi∗ with respect to τ holding i∗ constant is positive, as it indeed is, the aggregate
hazard rate is necessarily monotonically decreasing in τ . 
Proof of Proposition 4. We first show that in equilibrium outsiders invest in
R&D. Assume to the contrary that they do not. Then, from (10) we get

V1 =

π1
.
r

V1 >

co
,
g

Given inequality (18), this implies

which however violates the free entry condition (7). This contradiction proves
the claim. Next we show that there is no equilibrium in which outsiders and
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all leaders ℓi with i = 1, ..., m simultaneously invest in R&D. (This generalizes
a result originally obtained by Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999), who showed
that when m = 1 there is no equilibrium in which the leader and outsiders
simultaneously invest in R&D.) To show this, notice that xℓm > 0 implies
Vm =

cℓ
g−1

by condition (9). Similarly, under the assumption that xℓi > 0

for all i = 1, 2, ...m − 1 one can solve the complementary slackness conditions
in (8) recursively, obtaining V1 = V2 = ... = Vm =

cℓ
g−1 .

On the other hand, if

outsiders’s R&D investment is positive, one must have V1 =
V1 =

cℓ
g−1

and V1 =

co
g

cannot simultaneously hold if

co
cℓ

<

co
g .

g
g−1 .

But equations

Since outsiders

invest in R&D, there is at least an i such that xℓi = 0, whence the result
immediately follows. 
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